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The EWE is a consequence of one of the most important labor institutions: the 
unemployment benefit (UB). We develop a model with uncertainty about the results 
of the job seeking and transactions costs linked to such a search process in which a 
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an additional counter-cyclical pressure on aggregate labor supply, but with a 
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Keywords: Labor force participation, Business Cycle, Unemployment, 
Added-worker effect, Discouraged-worker effect, Unemployment Benefit 
 
 





Acknowledgements: The author was partially supported by the Spanish 
Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Competitiveness under project ECO2017-
82227-P.  
 




The analysis of cyclical movements in labor supply is essential to understand 
the size of the actual unemployment rate1. With the recent Great Recession 
or Global Financial Crisis, it has been clear that the business cycle is far from 
being under the control of the policymakers2. Therefore, the study of the 
cyclical evolution of the aggregate labor supply seems to deserve more 
attention. Now, with a deep recession on the near horizon because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, this topic is likely going to become central to the 
political and scholarly debates. This issue is particularly important, not only, 
in countries with high unemployment levels, like Spain, which will be used 
as the lab to test the main hypothesis of this paper for this reason, but in 
many other countries. 
 
In the literature, two effects have been considered traditionally 
regarding the cyclical movements of aggregate labor supply: the Added-
Worker Effect (AWE) and the Discouraged-Worker Effect (DWE). Whereas 
the AWE predicts a counter-cyclical behavior of the participation rate (PR), 
the DWE predicts pro-cyclical changes on such an aggregate. If the former 
prevails over the latter, the official unemployment rate is considered to 
overstate the true unemployment during downturns and, if the DWE is 
stronger than the AWE, the unemployment will be understated. Recently, the 
traditional pro-cyclical behavior of labor supply in Spain has been losing 
strength. This puzzle has been “solved” by scholarly commentators by just 
arguing that the DWE is weaker and/or the AWE is stronger than before.  
 
We do not agree with this simplistic way of reasoning, and the research 
question of this article might be formulated like this: is there another 
theoretical channel operating together with the AWE and the DWE 
accounting for the abovementioned facts? The answer would be affirmative. 
Thus, this work aims to identify, define accurately, and, finally, test a new 
effect related to the cyclical behavior of labor supply. This effect will be named 
the Entitled Worker Effect (EWE). The EWE is a consequence of the existence 
of a labor institution like the Unemployment Benefit (UB). This institution 
creates a specific type of moral hazard causing, workers to carry out an 
opportunistic behavior by supplying “fake” labor to be entitled to receive UB3. 
 
We build a microeconomic model of labor supply, and then we 
aggregate individual decisions to analyze macroeconomic fluctuations of labor 
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper, we will use the terms labor supply and participation rate 
interchangeably. Of course, they are not the same. Whereas the labor supply is an absolute 
measure, the participation rate is a relative figure (active population as a percentage of the 
working-age population). In our model, we do not consider population changes, so in that 
case, and after normalizing total working-age to 100, both terms coincide. 
2 See, for example, Cover and Mallick (2012). 
3 Previous literature has documented significant issues of moral hazard in the Spanish public 
social insurance system, not only the UB (e.g., Moral-Arce et al., 2019) but also in the sick 
leave system (e.g., Martín-Román and Moral, 2016, 2017). 
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supply. This methodological approach connects this research to the so-called 
neoclassical model of labor supply. We utilize this model since it has been the 
common reference framework to study labor supply choices, particularly the 
decision to enter the labor market. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that 
several modifications are made to that model, some of them as little 
neoclassical as the introduction of involuntary unemployment. More 
precisely, we develop a model with uncertainty about the results of the job 
seeking, and with transaction costs linked to the search process in which a 
kind of moral hazard appears. Put differently, we combine an extended 
version of the neoclassical model of labor supply, with some elements from 
the job-search theory. In this conceptual framework, new incentives for 
workers arise, and they produce an additional counter-cyclical pressure on 
aggregate supply, but with a different foundation from that of the AWE. 
 
As part of our approach, we also test the relevance of the EWE with 
Spanish data. Spain is an excellent “laboratory” due to its extremely high 
unemployment numbers4. At the same time, the cyclical fluctuations in the 
Spanish labor market are also enormous. Thus, the literature on Okun’s Law 
for Spain has documented an astonishing large Okun’s coefficient, close to 
one5. With these strong fluctuations in cyclical unemployment, the cyclical 
patterns in the PR should be easier to measure and identify. 
 
Regarding the theoretical results, we develop a framework where we 
account for the theoretical channels through which the AWE, the DWE, and 
the EWE operate. The AWE is a direct result of the neoclassical model, as it 
comes from the conventional income effect since leisure is habitually 
considered a normal good. Accounting for the DWE in the model is somewhat 
less straightforward. This effect a consequence of involuntary unemployment. 
For that reason, we consider an expected utility theoretical framework, in 
which the likelihood of finding a job is determined precisely by the 
unemployment rate. Furthermore, job-search transaction costs are 
incorporated into the model because the job-seeking process is costly (in terms 
of a loss of leisure time). With these two features, we capture the notion of the 
DWE naturally. Nonetheless, the novelty of this paper is the idea of the EWE. 
This effect is a sort of moral hazard that arises from the existence of the UB. 
This labor institution creates economic incentives that might produce an 
additional counter-cyclical behavior of the PR. Nonetheless, as will be clear 
later on, it has nothing to do with the theoretical foundations of the AWE. 
Indeed, the theoretical channel through which the EWE operates is the 
change in the likelihood of finding a job (the same through which the DWE 
operates, but with the opposite sign), not the change in non-labor income. The 
main prediction of the model may be stated as follows: as more individuals 
are potentially entitled to receive UB, the countercyclical pattern of the PR is 
strengthened. 
 
                                                          
4 See Cuéllar-Martín et al. (2019). 
5 See, for instance, Bande and Martín-Román (2018) or Porras and Martín-Román (2019). 
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As for the empirical results, they seem to give credit to the idea of a 
significant EWE in Spain in recent years. We provide some evidence 
supporting our hypothesis. Through three different econometric procedures 
to get a measure of the business cycle in the Spanish labor market, we observe 
a strong inverse correlation between the cyclical behavior of the PR and the 
percentage of potentially entitled workers to receive UB. Even though our 
empirical strategy is relatively straightforward, the findings are suggestive. 
The magnitude of the estimated correlation and the consistency of the 
outcomes using three distinct econometric methodologies point towards a 
relevant EWE. 
 
The value-added of the paper consists in unveiling a theoretical link 
between the PR and the business cycle, one different from the AWE and the 
DWE. Although these two competing ideas arose several years ago, they still 
generate considerable new scientific production (e.g., Österholm, 2010; 
Congregado et al., 2011; Congregado et al., 2020; Martín-Román et al., 2020). 
Nonetheless, the bulk of this sort of research is empirically oriented. Our view 
is that, even though additional and clarifying empirical evidence would be 
welcome, in order not to interpret wrongly the true mechanisms driving the 
empirical evidence, a theoretical guide is needed. Furthermore, if the cyclical 
effects operating are not correctly identified, researchers might mislead 
policymakers when advising them with economic policy prescriptions 
(Granville and Mallick, 2009). 
 
Thus, the economic policy implications of this research are pretty 
significant, remarkably when you take into account the volume of financial 
resources devoted to UB by governments in many countries. As will be shown, 
the EWE predicts a counter-cyclical behavior of PR. However, the theoretical 
foundations could not be more different from those of the AWE. The EWE 
leads to opportunistic behavior, generating a “fictitious” labor supply 
motivated by a labor institution such as UB. Needless to say that while it is 
difficult to fight against unemployment overestimation due to AWE from 
economic policy grounds, it is more feasible to reduce that overestimation 
because of the EWE by taking political action to monitor this behavior. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the 
background regarding the cyclical movements of labor supply, including a few 
basic concepts and the related literature. Section 3 presents the model to 
illustrate the EWE. There, the AWE and the DWE are characterized formally, 
and the EWE is obtained as a cross effect (i.e., a second-order effect). Section 
4 explains the empirical strategy employed and shows the outcomes. Different 
approaches are followed to measure the business cycle, and all of them seem 
to support the theoretical framework developed in this research. Finally, 
section 5 concludes and discusses the results, giving special emphasis to the 
economic policy implications that can be derived from them. 
 
 




2.1. AWE versus DWE 
 
The idea behind the AWE could be traced back to the final years of the Great 
Depression (Woytinsky, 1940; Humphrey, 1940). The argument behind this 
hypothesis is that when the family’s breadwinner loses his/her job during a 
downturn, his/her spouse would have more economic incentives to participate 
in the labor market to replace the income lost. Although quite sophisticated 
models of family labor supply have been developed to explain this 
phenomenon6, it can be easily formalized within the textbook model of labor 
supply (see next section). 
 
Regarding the DWE, the works by Long (1953, 1958) outline the 
concept for the first time. It refers to situations in which workers’ expectations 
about the results of the job search are so bad (during a downturn again) that 
workers give up seeking. Thus, those previously counted as unemployed 
workers are now considered out of the labor force. Consequently, we might 
state that DWE has to do with the uncertainty associated with the job-seeking 
process. The textbook model of labor supply is not accurate to conceptualize 
this effect for a very simple reason: it does not consider the uncertainty 
(associated with involuntary unemployment) about the result of the job 
search.  
 
Although both the AWE and the DWE originally tried to describe the 
situation in the labor market during a downturn, when the economy is 
booming, the same phenomenon takes place, but with the opposite sign. The 
literature has established that the DWE is associated with the pro-cyclical 
behavior of the PR, and the AWE with the counter-cyclical fluctuations of the 
PR. Consequently, the DWE is related to an underestimation of the 
unemployment rate during the downturns and an overestimation during the 
booms. On the other hand, if the AWE prevailed, the “actual” unemployment 
rate would be higher than the official one during recessions (or weak economic 
growth periods) and lower during economic expansions. 
 
Both effects might be operating at the same time throughout the 
business cycle. Thus, an observer would see the net effect when checking the 
data. To illustrate this idea, in panel (a) of Figure 1, we show a stylized 
business cycle (let us call it 𝑋𝑋) with a range of variation between −1 and 1 
(i.e., 𝑋𝑋 ∈ [−1,1]). This cyclical variable is depicted in a solid blue line. For 
instance, if we assume that every 1-percentage point increase in 𝑋𝑋 causes a 
DWE of +0.6 percentage points (dotted red line) and an AWE of −0.4 
percentage points, we might estimate econometrically a total net effect (TNE) 
of +0.2 percentage points. In this example, we have assumed that the DWE 
is stronger than the AWE, and, consequently, the TNE is positive. 
 
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Pérez et al. (2015, 2020). 




As regards the studies drawing on aggregate data and employing time-
series econometric techniques, Elmeskov and Pichelmann (1993) estimate the 
elasticity of the participation rates to the business cycle, finding that the 
DWE is the dominant hypothesis. Darby et al. (2001) find that the DWE is 
prevailing, stronger in the downward phase of the cycle, and essentially a 
female phenomenon. Benati (2001), who produces empirical evidence on the 
existence of a significant DWE in the US labor market, reviews the literature 
on time-series econometrics too. This author states that seven studies (Long, 
1953 and 1958; Hansen, 1961; Wachter, 1972, 1977; Goodman, 1974; Clark 
and Summers, 1982) do not reveal relevant evidence of pro- or counter-
cyclicality in labor force or participation rates time series, except, for Long, 
under conditions of severe depression. One study (Wachter, 1974) is 
inconclusive. Two studies (Barth, 1968; Bowen and Finegan, 1969) present 
evidence of a weak DWE. Finally, five studies (Tella, 1964, 1965; Mincer, 
1966; Perry, 1977; Clark and Summers, 1981) show evidence of a significant 
DWE7. Finally, Wasmer (2009) delves into the bidirectional relationship 
between unemployment and labor participation, confirming the inverse 
relationship between the participation rate and the unemployment rate, 
which gives support to the DWE. 
 
Regarding the literature using cross-sectional analysis, Stephens 
(2002) finds evidence of the prevalence of the AWE in the long-term response 
of a wife’s labor supply to her husband’s job loss for the US economy. Bhalotra 
and Umana-Aponte (2010), also using microdata and referring to 63 
developing and transition countries, find mixed evidence on the AWE and the 
DWE. They conclude, however, that the AWE is an important issue for certain 
socio-demographic groups and determined countries. Two papers pointing 
towards the relevance of the AWE for particular socioeconomic groups are 
Prieto-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-Gutierrez (2000, 2003). 
 
Finally, Congregado et al. (2011), employing a threshold cointegration 
model to Spanish data, establish that the AWE dominates the DWE, but only 
when unemployment is below 11.7%. Although, for international standards, 
this threshold seems to be rather high, for the Spanish case is, in fact, quite 
low. Therefore, the conclusion is that the PR in Spain exhibits a low degree of 
cyclical sensitivity. Congregado et al. (2014) obtain evidence for a linear DWE 
for men. The AWE is statistically significant for women, but again, this only 
applies when the unemployment rates are below a certain threshold. 
 
 
                                                          
7 The prevalence of the DWE over the AWE should be qualified. For instance, Parker and 
Skoufias (2004) detect a significant AWE for women in Mexico. Lee and Parasnis (2014) 
conclude that the DWE predominates in OCDE countries, whereas the AWE prevails in 
developing countries. 
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2.2. UB and labor supply 
 
Textbooks on macroeconomics consider UB as one of the key determinants of 
natural unemployment. The underlying reason for that is that UB may affect 
the strength of workers’ representatives by enhancing their power in the 
collective bargaining processes8. Thus, UB has been established to affect 
collective labor supply in unionized labor markets. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical avenue linking UB and labor supply that has attracted more 
attention among researchers has an individual basis: the job-search theory, 
which focuses on worker’s behavior when looking for a job, a relevant 
dimension of labor supply. 
 
The modern job-search theory arose in the 1970s (McCall, 1970; 
Mortensen, 1970). A good synthesis of this theory can be found in different 
surveys (e.g., Lippman and McCall, 1976a, 1976b; Mortensen, 1986; 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Rogerson et al., 2005; Rogerson and Shimer, 
2011). Two elements of the job-search theory are particularly relevant for this 
paper, and thus, we incorporate them into the conceptual setting developed 
here. First, finding a job implies a search cost in terms of a loss of leisure that 
can be considered a transaction cost (i.e., to get a job, the worker has to look 
for one for some time). Second, and even more crucially, the result of that 
seeking process is uncertain (i.e., after the search, there is no guarantee of 
finding a job, and the worker might remain unemployed). 
 
Job search models predict, in most cases, that the more generous UB 
is, the longer the unemployment spells among those UB beneficiaries are. 
This suggestive prediction has been tested overwhelmingly within the 
empirical literature. For example, the early bibliography on this issue, using 
macroeconomic data, establish a clear positive relationship between the 
generosity of UB and the unemployment level (e.g., Layard et al., 1991; 
Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Bassanini, 2006). 
 
The microeconomic literature on this topic is even more extensive. Two 
surveying research works on this subject for the early literature are Atkinson 
and Micklewright (1991) and Pedersen and Westergård-Nielsen (2000). As a 
summary, the empirical evidence obtained detects significant effects of UB in 
the United States and the UK, and much weaker effects in Continental 
Europe (e.g., Holmlund, 1998; Nickell, 1979; Fallick, 1991; Ham and Rea 
1987; Meyer, 1990; Katz and Meyer,1990; Hunt, 1995; Carling et al., 1996; 
Winter-Ebmer, 1998). A common denominator in the results of this literature 
is that when the entitlement for receiving the UB compensation is close to 
expiring, the likelihood of finding a job increases suspiciously. This outcome 
has been interpreted as a clear sign of duration moral hazard linked to UB. 
 
More recently, a new strand of research has emerged to isolate the true 
causal effect of both entitlement and the replacement rate on labor supply. It 
                                                          
8 See, for instance, Cabo and Martin-Roman (2019) for a formal analysis. 
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uses quasi-experimental designs, such as the differences-in-differences 
estimator or the regression discontinuity design. See, for instance, Card and 
Levine (2000) for the US, Carling et al. (2001), Bennmarker et al. (2007), Røed 
and Zhang (2003), Uusitalo and Verho (2010) for the Nordic Countries, Van 
Ours and Vodopivec (2006), Lalive et al. (2006), Card et al. (2007), Lalive 
(2007, 2008), Schmieder et al. (2012), Caliendo et al. (2013) for Central 
European countries, or Le Barbanchon (2016), Addison and Portugal (2008), 
Centeno and Novo (2006, 2009, 2014) for other European countries. The 
Spanish case also reveals significant disincentive effects associated with the 
UB (e.g., Bover et al., 2002; Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez, 2015; Rebollo-
Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2018). The main conclusion to be drawn from 
this literature is that there are notable consequences on the unemployment 
duration if the replacement rate or the potential benefit duration (PBD) 
changes. To sum up, an extension of the PBD lengthens unemployment 
duration by about 20% of such PBD time extension. Also, the elasticity of 
unemployment duration with respect to UB is estimated to be in the range of 





Economic incentives matter. The job-seeking behavior of individuals is 
influenced by both the replacement rate of UB and the entitlement to receive 
it. Thus, theoretical research has put much effort into modeling these issues. 
Dynamic macroeconomic models have been used to examine the relationship 
between unemployment, UB, and labor force participation. For example, 
Pries and Rogerson (2009) present a modified job-search model to account for 
labor force decisions. Another theoretical framework, closely related to the 
previous one, used to analyze the unemployment-participation relationship is 
real business cycle (RBC) models (e.g., Veracierto, 2008).  
 
The theoretical setting developed in this article takes into account 
some of the features of this type of modelling, but, at the same time, makes 
changes to account for the EWE, without making the modelling process 
unnecessarily complex9. We are interested in incorporating into the model the 
idea of uncertainty associated with the seeking activity. This assumption 
implies that the individual may remain unemployed after the search and, 
hence, the notion of unemployment is added to the conceptual framework. 
Also, we are aware of the fact that job-search is costly for the worker and, 
consequently, we take into consideration this aspect into the setting. 
 
In the previously mentioned literature, the focus is on the search 
process. Therefore, whereas the job search is modeled in detail, the treatment 
of the consumption-leisure substitution is kept relatively simple from an 
analytical point of view. Here, on the other hand, we make the opposite 
                                                          
9 A different theoretical approach, away from the job-search theory, is adopted by Prescott 
(2004) and Prescott and Wallenius (2012). 
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decision, i.e., we put our attention on the consumption-leisure substitution 
(which is essential to understand the different nature of the EWE) and keep 
relatively simple the job search in the modeling task. 
 
The job-search theory is intrinsically dynamic, but we do not need a 
dynamic model to illustrate how the AWE, the DWE, or the EWE operate. 
This is the reason why we adopt a static framework10. Our interest is not on 
duration moral hazard, as the dynamic job-search theory, but on incidence 
moral hazard11. We examine how the individual’s labor supply behavior 
changes when he/she is a beneficiary of the UB, and how this fact ends up 
affecting the cyclical properties of the aggregate labor supply. The behavioral 
change analyzed is not dynamic in nature, as will be shown in a later section, 
and thereby the model used is static. 
 
As will be proved, the EWE is a counter-cyclical effect operating only 
among those workers who are entitled to receive the UB. Therefore, the main 
hypothesis of the paper could be enunciated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: As the number of individuals entitled to receive the UB 
increases, so do the counter-cyclical forces affecting the PR cyclical 
pattern. Therefore, in a labor market A with a higher proportion of UB 
beneficiaries than in a labor market B, the PR should exhibit a less pro-
cyclical or a more counter-cyclical behavior. 
 
The panel (b) of Figure 1 illustrates Hypothesis 1 graphically. We 
make a distinction there between a total net effect in a labor market without 
any UB beneficiary, TNE1, and a second scenario in which the number of UB 
beneficiaries increases progressively, TNE2. The panel (b) of Figure 1 begins 
assuming a pro-cyclical pattern of PR. In the second scenario, however, as 
more and more individuals gain the right to collect UB, that pro-cyclical 
behavior weakens as a consequence of the EWE, ending up in a practically 
non-cyclical behavior of the PR. 
 
 
3. The model 
 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
 
A labor market participation model is built based on the neoclassical 
framework of choice between leisure-work and consumption-income. As we 
are interested in the extensive margin of the labor supply, we consider a fixed 
working week. Hence, labor supply choices coincide with participation 
                                                          
10 A few papers study how UB affects various aspects of labor supply from a dynamic 
standpoint. See, for example, Boone (2004), Boone and Van Ours (2006), or Cahuc and 
Fontaine (2009). None of them, however, model the same behavioral trait addressed in this 
paper. 
11 See, for instance, Moral-Arce et al. (2019) for a brief discussion on the types of moral hazard 
affecting the UB. 
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decisions (e.g., Boeri and Van Ours, 2013; or Cahuc et al. 2014). The model is 
extended here to account for the effects of unemployment (i.e., the likelihood 
of being in the labor force without a job), as in Martin-Roman et al. (2020). 
Likewise, this paper’s model is additionally extended to address the influence 
of UB on the choice set for the individual. 
 
The UB is considered here as an income linked to the job search. To 
receive the UB, workers need to spend some time engaged in job-search 
activities to prove their willingness to work to the unemployment office12. 
Therefore, unemployed workers are individuals who actively look for a job but 
do not find it. Thus, all UB beneficiaries are in the labor force. We also assume 
that if workers turn down a job offer, they might lose the right to receive UB 
with a determined probability. 
 
The rest of the main assumptions of the model are listed below: 
 
Assumption 1. Labor is homogenous, i.e., the wage is the same for all 
workers13. 
 
Assumption 2. Labor contracts last one period. 
 
Assumption 3. There exists a certain amount of time associated with 
labor participation. Before signing a new contract, the worker has to 
devote 𝑠𝑠 units of time to job-search activities. Here, 𝑠𝑠 is considered a fixed 
and exogenous sum of time14. 
 
Assumption 4. There exists a positive unemployment rate. That rate 
determines the likelihood 𝑝𝑝 of finding a job, which is the same for all 
individuals15.  
 
Assumption 5. There are two kinds of individuals in the economy. Type-
E workers are eligible to receive UB if they fulfill the requirements 
described below. Type-N workers are not entitled to receive UB. The 
percentage of individuals of both types is given at every moment16. 
                                                          
12 In Spain, like in many other countries, to gain entitlement to UB, it is necessary to fulfill 
three requisites: (1) not having a job, (2) searching for a job, and (3) be willing to accept a 
suitable job offer within a brief period. 
13 The mechanism behind the wage formation (i.e., competitive forces, collective bargaining, 
or a mixture of both) is not significant here. Individuals are wage-takers, whatever the 
mechanisms for setting the wage to prevail in the economy. 
14 It is out the scope of the paper to consider 𝑠𝑠 as an endogenous variable. That is the field of 
the job-search theory. See the previous section for some classical surveys on such a theory, 
or, more recently, Tatsiramos and van Ours (2012, 2014). 
15 In other words, unemployment is primarily involuntary. Obviously, the higher the 
unemployment rate, the lower is 𝑝𝑝. 
16 It would be possible to endogenize the percentage of type-E and type-N workers in the 
model. Nonetheless, such a model would require, at least, a two-period horizon. That model 
would add much complexity with a little gain in terms of predictive capability. For the sake 
of simplicity, we assume that past labor supply decisions have already been made and the 
percentages of type-E and type-N workers are given. 
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Assumption 6. There exists a UB in the economy, denoted by 𝑏𝑏. Type-E 
individuals that have looked for a job for 𝑠𝑠 units of time, without finding 
one, are eligible to UB. Furthermore, type-E individuals could reject a job 
if they found one. If this were the case, the employment authority might 
sanction the individual with the loss of the right to receive the UB. This 
occurs with probability (1 − 𝑞𝑞). With probability 𝑞𝑞, type-E individuals 
still receive the UB after turning down a job offer17. 
 
Assumption 7. The size of the working week, which we denote by 𝑙𝑙,̅ is 
fixed and exogenously determined18. 
 
Assumption 8. The utility function is additive. If we call 𝐶𝐶 to the 
consumption (or the income because there is no saving) and 𝐻𝐻 to the 
leisure time (i.e., total time minus hours of work), we have: 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶,𝐻𝐻) =𝛬𝛬(𝐶𝐶) + 𝛺𝛺(𝐻𝐻). As usual, marginal utilities are supposed to be positive and 
decreasing19. 
 
The set of alternatives for the worker is shown in Figure 2. Inside the 
utility function, the levels of consumption (𝐶𝐶) and leisure (𝐻𝐻) have been 
replaced by the corresponding values associated with each decision. Thereby, 
we are already taking into account the budget constrain within the 
framework of choice. As mentioned, 𝑤𝑤 is the real wage per unit of time, 𝑙𝑙 ̅
stands for the duration of the fixed working week, 𝑦𝑦 is the real non-labor 
income, 𝑏𝑏 is the UB, and 𝑠𝑠 stands for the job-search duration linked to the 




From now onwards, type-E individuals will be our baseline reference, 
who are potentially eligible to receive UB in case of not finding a job after a 
search process (i.e., 𝑏𝑏 > 0). The analysis of type-N individuals is just a 
particular case: we only have to assume that 𝑏𝑏 = 0. When necessary, we will 
highlight the differences in behavior between both groups. 
 
According to Figure 2, a type-E individual has three options. Each of 
these options is associated with a level of utility, certain or expected: (1) not 
to participate, 
 
(1)                                                 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1), 
 
(2) to participate and reject a job offer if they find one, 
                                                          
17 This is the origin of the moral hazard we will elaborate later on. 
18 As mentioned before, since we are interested in the extensive margin of the labor supply, 
this assumption allows us to focus on the participation decision. 
19 This assumption is less restricting than it seems. Within the ordinal utility theory, a 
logarithmic transformation of the very well-known Cobb–Douglas utility function is also 
additive, representing an identical set of preferences. 
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(2)             𝑝𝑝�𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠), 
 
which could be also written as 
 
                    𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)� + 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞), 
 
and (3) to participate and accept a job offer in case of finding one. 
 
(3)         𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) 
 
 
3.2. Opportunistic supply of labor (moral hazard) 
 
From expressions (1) to (3), it can be deduced that the worker is going to 
participate in the labor market whenever expression (4) holds: 
 
(4)         𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)� + 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞) ≥ 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) 
 
This is so regardless of the real wage prevailing in the labor market. 
Although the wage were 𝑤𝑤 = 0, the individual would participate because the 
expectancy of collecting UB would compensate for the time spent in job-search 
activities. In such a case, the individual would deal with labor participation 
as a game. Such a game offers him/her the opportunity of winning a prize 
(UB), with a likelihood �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)�, in exchange for a cost: it is necessary 
to search for a job during 𝑠𝑠 units of time. Nevertheless, individuals know that 
whether they had the “bad luck” of coming across a job, they would turn it 
down. 
 
The critical value of the UB (𝑏𝑏∗) that induces workers’ participation in 
any circumstances is the one that solves the equation (5): 
 
(5)           𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)� + 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) 
 
In other words: if 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑏𝑏∗, individuals will opt to look for a job (i.e., they 
will choose to participate), regardless of the wage existing in the market 
(because in some circumstances they will turn down the job offer). Put 
differently, if 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑏𝑏∗, the reservation wage would be zero (𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅 = 0). Needless 
to say that the reservation wage (𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅) has its usual interpretation here. 
 
At this point, the following question arises: assuming that 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑏𝑏∗, when 
is a job offer going to be accepted or rejected? After finding a job, an individual 
will take it whenever the earnings linked to such a post compensate for the 
leisure time lost associated with the working week. Nonetheless, we need to 
point out that the choice of accepting or turning down a job offer does not 
depend on 𝑝𝑝. Expression (6) displays the critical wage that equals the utility 
of accepting or declining a job offer: 
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(6)             𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤∗𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� = 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) 
 
We dub “acceptance wage” to 𝑤𝑤∗ so as to differentiate it from the notion 
of reservation wage explained above20. It is evident that if 𝑤𝑤 ≥ 𝑤𝑤∗, individuals 
accept the job, and if 𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤∗, they reject it. Something that will prove useful 
later is to know how 𝑤𝑤∗ depends on 𝑏𝑏. From expression (6), we may define an 
implicit function and demonstrate that 𝑤𝑤∗ is an increasing and concave 
function of b when represented in the space (𝑤𝑤, 𝑏𝑏) as we do in Figure 3. 
 
[Figure 3] 
 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤∗𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏 = 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏)𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤∗𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� > 0 
 𝜕𝜕2𝑤𝑤∗𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 = 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏)�𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤∗𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦��2 < 0 
 
From the preceding discussion, it can be deduced that there exists an 
opportunistic labor supply for specific values of 𝑏𝑏 and 𝑤𝑤. If 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑏𝑏∗ and 𝑤𝑤 < 𝑤𝑤∗, 
individuals will participate in the labor market (they will supply a positive 
number of working hours 𝑙𝑙)̅, but this a “fictitious” labor supply since those 
working hours cannot be hired by the employers in the economy. From a 
different standpoint: the UB creates economic incentives that change 
individuals’ behavior resulting in a moral hazard issue. 
 
 
3.3. UB and labor supply 
 
Let us now consider the case when 𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏∗. How is the participation 
threshold determined under these circumstances? If that were the situation, 
it would be nonsense that individuals participate (experiencing a leisure time 
loss due to the search transaction costs) to reject the job that they could find. 
An individual would participate so as to accept the job. Formally, as the utility 
value of (2) is lower than that of (1), the only reason for an individual to 
participate is that the utility value of (3) is higher or equal to that of (1). 
Consequently, expression (7) provides the participation threshold: 
 
(7)            𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) 
 
Therefore, we have a two-tier reservation wage. Expression (8) 
summarizes this situation: 
                                                          
20 Both of them may be deemed as thresholds to make a decision. We could state that our 
reservation wage here suits the idea of reservation wage of the very well-known (static) 
neoclassical model of labor supply, whereas our acceptance wage is slightly related to the 
notion of reservation wage of the (dynamic) job-search theory. 
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(8)                                         𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = �0     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑏𝑏∗𝑤𝑤+ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏∗ 
 
Where 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 is the reservation wage for a type-E individual. It is 
convenient to go deeper into the characteristics of 𝑤𝑤+ to understand all the 
implications of the model. Firstly, it is possible to prove that 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 is a 
decreasing and concave function of 𝑏𝑏. From expression (7), and making use of 
the implicit function theorem, we obtain: 
 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤+𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏 = − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� < 0 
 𝜕𝜕2𝑤𝑤+𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏2 = −−(1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙2̅𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦��𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦��2 < 0 
 
Secondly, it is easy to see that 𝑤𝑤+ > 𝑤𝑤∗ holds (obviously for 𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏∗, that 
it is when 𝑤𝑤+ is really defined). The proof can be carried out by using the 
definitions in expressions (6) and (7). Thus, from condition (7), we implicitly 
know that: 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠). On the other 
hand, it is evident that: 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) >  𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠). As a consequence, we 
obtain: 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� > 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠). Finally, 
the previous expression together with condition (6) implies that: 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� > 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤∗𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠�. Or, in other words, 𝑤𝑤+ > 𝑤𝑤∗ provided that 𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏∗. 
 
Figure 3 depicts these outcomes. In that figure, the space (𝑤𝑤, 𝑏𝑏) is 
divided into four parts. A type-E individual whose combination of 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑏𝑏 
were located in the zone (II) would never participate. If his/her combination 
of 𝑤𝑤 and 𝑏𝑏 were located in the zones (I) or (III), he/she would participate. 
Furthermore, he/she would accept a job in the case of finding one. Finally, the 
zone (IV) illustrates those situations of moral hazard abovementioned. If it 
were the case, a type-E individual would enter the labor market, but to reject 
a job offer in any instance. 
 
In Figure 3, it is also depicted the reservation wage for a type-N 
individual (𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅). Formally, this would be a particular case of the more general 
expression (7). That is, making 𝑏𝑏 = 0 in (7), we obtain expression (9): 
 
(9)                       𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) 
 
From (9), it is clear that 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 is always positive (𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 > 0)21. As depicted 
in Figure 3, 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 coincides with the maximum value of 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅, reached precisely 
                                                          
21 Focusing first on leisure time, we have that 1 > (1 − 𝑠𝑠) > ( 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠). This would entail that 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅ > 𝑦𝑦 to obtain  equality in (9), which in turn implies that 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 > 0. 
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when 𝑏𝑏 = 0. As 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 does not depend on 𝑏𝑏, it is a horizontal line in the space 
(𝑤𝑤, 𝑏𝑏) represented in Figure 3. 
 
 
3.4. Aggregation process 
 
Now, let us study the aggregation process. Assuming that workers have 
different preferences over consumption-income and leisure-work, different 
non-labor incomes, and there are differences in their entitlement to receive 
UB, they will have diverse reservation wages. This heterogeneity of 
reservation wages 𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅 ∈ [0, +∞) might be represented by a cumulative 
distribution function 𝜙𝜙(·). If the rest of the PR determinants do not change 
(i.e., non-labor income, the likelihood of finding a job, and the UB), the 
aggregate labor supply could be expressed in formal terms according to (10): 
 
(10)                                            𝐿𝐿 = 𝑁𝑁 · 𝜙𝜙(·) 
 
Where 𝐿𝐿 stands for the labor force and 𝑁𝑁 stands for the total working-
age population. The PR is simply 𝜙𝜙(·), as expressed in equation (11): 
 
(11)                                      𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁 = 𝜙𝜙(·) 
 
Since 𝜙𝜙(·) is a cumulative distribution function, by definition, it is 
increasing in its argument, 𝜙𝜙𝑤𝑤 > 0. Nevertheless, as shown below, not only 
the non-labor income but also the likelihood of finding a job and the UB play 
a significant role in determining PR because they do change. To incorporate 
this idea, let us call 𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  the reservation wage for the median individual within 
the cumulative distribution. Thus, expression (12) describes a stylized PR 
function: 
 
(12)                                           𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝜙𝜙(𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅) 
 
As mentioned, (𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤⁄ ) > 0 by definition. On the other hand, 
consistent with the concept of reservation wage (𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅⁄ ) < 0. It is worth 
recalling that 𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  is, in turn, a function of some additional arguments. In the 
model developed here, 𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  depends on 𝑦𝑦, 𝑝𝑝, and 𝑏𝑏. Besides, we have to point 
out that both 𝑦𝑦(𝑋𝑋) and 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋) are regarded as functions of the business cycle 
(𝑋𝑋). We assume that if the business cycle 𝑋𝑋 is booming, the state of the 
economy improves, whereas when X decreases, the economy worsens22. As a 
conclusion, we may rewrite expression (12) as follows: 
 
(13)                                𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝜙𝜙(𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 [𝑦𝑦(𝑋𝑋),𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋),𝑏𝑏]) 
 
                                                          
22 Later on, we devote some additional effort to explain how we measure 𝑋𝑋 in statistical terms 
and its implications. 
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Equation (13) reveals that PR depends on the business cycle through a 
double channel. On the one hand, cyclical variations in the median worker’s 
non-labor income give rise to the AWE. On the other hand, cyclical changes 
in the likelihood of finding a job result in the DWE. More importantly, 
equation (13) also shows that the level of UB may cause a cross effect or 
second-order effect (𝜕𝜕2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏⁄ ), which is the origin of the EWE, as explained 
in greater detail below. 
 
 
3.5. The Added-Worker Effect 
 
During an economic downturn, some breadwinners lose their job. As a 
consequence, their spouses would experience a reduction in their non-labor 
incomes which, in turn, would reduce their reservation wages and, at an 
aggregate level, the PR would rise. The opposite would happen otherwise. 
Furthermore, this counter-cyclical behavior of PR would induce an 
overestimation (underestimation) of the “true” aggregate unemployment rate 
in downturns (upturns). 
 
This classical result (i.e., the AWE) fits well in our theoretical 
framework. First, let us analyze type-E individuals. Making use again of the 
implicit function theorem and computing how 𝑤𝑤+ depends on 𝑦𝑦, we obtain: 
 
(14)               
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤+𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 = −𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏) − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� > 0 
 
It is straightforward to derive the positive sign in (14). The 
denominator is positive. As regards the numerator, a realistic assumption is 
that 𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅ > 𝑏𝑏, which implies that 𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦 > 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑦𝑦 > 𝑦𝑦23. Since the marginal 
utilities are decreasing, 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦) > 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏 + 𝑦𝑦) > 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦�. A linear 
combination of 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑏𝑏 + 𝑦𝑦) and 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� is less than 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦), and, together 
with the minus sign affecting the whole fraction, (14) has a  positive sign. 
 
The effect of 𝑦𝑦 on 𝑏𝑏∗ has also to be studied so as to obtain a complete 
description of type-E individuals. Using the implicit function theorem again, 
we have: 
 
(15)           
𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏∗𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 = −𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗)�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)� + 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗)�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)� > 0 
 
Finally, it is also necessary to know how 𝑤𝑤∗ changes when 𝑦𝑦 varies, 
maintaining constant 𝑏𝑏 (and the rest of the factors affecting 𝑤𝑤∗):  
 
                                                          
23 The assumption of 𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅ > 𝑏𝑏 fits the facts. See, for instance: 
http://www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm 
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(16)                 
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤∗𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 = −𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤∗𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� − 𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏) − (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦)𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤∗𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� > 0 
 
Expressions (14) to (16) characterize the behavior of type-E individuals 
when non-labor income changes, and that is depicted in Figure 4 (taking a 




The analysis of type-N individuals is easier. From equation (9): 
 
(17)                
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 = −𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦) − 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� > 0 
 
The positive sign in (17) implies a downward shift of the horizontal line 
representing 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 in Figure 3 (recall that the reference is a decrease in 𝑦𝑦). 
 
From the previous discussion, it is quite evident that if we pooled 
together type-E and type-N individuals, a reduction of the non-labor income 
(as a consequence of a downturn) would decrease the reservation wage of the 
median worker. This fact, in turn, would encourage labor participation. In 
more formal terms, and maintaining constant 𝑝𝑝 when the business cycle 
varies (to disentangle the different effects), we may describe the AWE 
through (18): 
 
(18)                                          
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 �?̅?𝑝 = 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 · 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 · 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 < 0 
 
since we know that 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋⁄ > 0 (by hypothesis), that 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦⁄ > 0 (from the 




3.6. The Discouraged-Worker Effect 
 
The original idea of the DWE establishes that when the likelihood of finding 
a job falls, some workers quit active job search (i.e., they become inactive), 
and the opposite occurs otherwise. The rationale behind this is that as the 
expectations of finding a job worsen, the transaction costs linked to the search 
process could exceed the expected benefits since these diminish. Therefore, 
the PR would exhibit a pro-cyclical pattern, and, as a consequence, the 
“actual” unemployment rate would be underestimated (overestimated) in 
slumps (in booms). 
 
The way of formalizing the DWE within the model is through 𝑝𝑝. For the 
sake of simplicity, and to disentangle the DWE from the EWE, we focus on 
type-N individuals in this subsection. Evidently, in a world with 𝑏𝑏 = 0 for 
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every worker, there is no place for the EWE. Thus, behavioral changes caused 
by cyclical movements in 𝑝𝑝 can be identified with the DWE in this theoretical 
setting24. 
 
Looking at the reservation wage condition for type-N individuals 
summarized by equation (9), it is straightforward to compute the effects of 
changes in 𝑝𝑝 on 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅:  
 
(19)        
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 = −𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� < 0 
 
The negative sign of (19) is the result of the definition given in (9). First, 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠). Second, in order to achieve equality in (9), 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 −𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) has to be fulfilled. Put in other words: when 𝑝𝑝 
rises (drops), 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 decreases (increases). 
 
Thus, a stylized mathematical version of the DWE may be written 
through expression (20): 
 
(20)                                       
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 �𝑦𝑦� = 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 · 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 · 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 > 0 
 
with the superscript N referring to an economy composed exclusively by type-
N individuals. In expression (20), the level of non-labor income has been 
maintained constant. As before, we can affirm that 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋⁄ > 0 (by hypothesis), 
that  𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝⁄ < 0 (from the discussion in this section), and that 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 <⁄ 0 (from the concept of reservation wage). 
 
 
3.7. The Entitled-Worker Effect 
 
The model developed can simultaneously rationalize and formalize the AWE 
and the DWE by means of expressions (18) and (20), respectively. However, 
the real novelty of this article is to rationalize and formalize the EWE, which 
operates through the same channel as the DWE (i.e., changes in 𝑝𝑝) but entails 
a counter-cyclical behavior of the PR (like the AWE). 
 
As the EWE is exclusively linked to UB, we primarily focus on type-E 
individuals in this subsection. The behavior of type-E individuals is 
summarized by 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅, which, in turn, depends on the function 𝑤𝑤∗(𝑏𝑏). From 
condition (6), it is clear that 𝑤𝑤∗ is not affected by changes in 𝑝𝑝. Nevertheless, 
that does not imply that 𝑏𝑏∗ is not affected either. From expression (5), we 
have: 
                                                          
24 Indeed, when the DWE was proposed first, the UB system was much less generous than 
now. Thus, the EWE should have been less important than it might be today in modern 
welfare states. 
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(21)                      
𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏∗𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 = − (𝑞𝑞 − 1)�𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) − 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)�𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗)�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝)� > 0 
 
The positive sign in (21) determines a direct relationship between 𝑝𝑝 
and 𝑏𝑏∗. Finally, to complete the analysis of type-E individuals, it is necessary 
to establish how 𝑤𝑤+ varies when 𝑝𝑝 changes: 
 
(22)                   
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤+𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 = −𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙?̅?𝑈𝐶𝐶�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦� ⋛ 0 
 
The sign in (22) can be either positive or negative. This is due to the 
ambiguity of the numerator since 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� ⋛ 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠). The 
denominator is always positive. However, it is still possible to reach some 
conclusions about the pattern of 𝑤𝑤+ when 𝑝𝑝 changes. First, let us compare 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) with 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1). Whereas 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) is an increasing function 
of 𝑏𝑏, 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) does not depend on 𝑏𝑏. Consequently, it is feasible to find a level 𝑏𝑏+ for which 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏+, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1). For 𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏+, we have 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) <𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1), and for 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑏𝑏+ the following relationship 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1) 
holds. We have to point out that always 𝑏𝑏+ < 𝑏𝑏∗. This result comes from the 
definition of 𝑏𝑏∗ in equation (5), which implies that 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1). 
As, by hypothesis, we have 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏+, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1), it follows that 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏∗, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏+, 1 − 𝑠𝑠), and accordingly that 𝑏𝑏+ < 𝑏𝑏∗. In other 
words, when 𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏+, expression (22) has a negative sign, and a positive sign 
when 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑏𝑏+. Evidently, when 𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏+ we have that 𝑈𝑈�𝑤𝑤+𝑙𝑙 ̅+ 𝑦𝑦, 1 − 𝑙𝑙 ̅ − 𝑠𝑠� =𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦 + 𝑏𝑏, 1 − 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑦𝑦, 1), and (22) equals zero. 
 
The implications for the type-E individuals’ reservation wage of the 
above discussion are shown in Figure 5 (with a reduction in the likelihood 𝑝𝑝 
as the reference). For low levels of UB (i.e., for 𝑏𝑏 < 𝑏𝑏+), the response of the 
reservation wage would be qualitatively the same as that of type-N 
individuals: a decline in 𝑝𝑝 causes a rise in the reservation wage. Figure 5 
also displays the change of 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅, although it is just a shift upwards of a parallel 
to the X-axis line, because 𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 does not depend on 𝑏𝑏. Nonetheless, for UB levels 
high enough (i.e., for 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑏𝑏+), the relationship between the probability of 
finding a job and the reservation wage turns around, and we obtain a direct 
association between 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅. This is the basis for the EWE: some type-E 
individuals could be encouraged to look for a job when the perspectives of 
finding one are worsening because of the institutional prerequisite 
abovementioned so as to receive the UB payments, which creates the moral 




To sum up, in a world with only type-E individuals, some of them would 
be encouraged (discouraged) to search for a job when the business cycle 
improves (worsens), but others would be discouraged (encouraged). Formally: 
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(23)                                        
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 �𝑦𝑦� = 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 · 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 · 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 ⋛ 0 
 
with the superscript E referring to a world made up only of type-E 




3.8. The Total Effect 
 
Now, we analyze the three effects jointly. To better understand how the EWE 
operates, let us imagine a world without UB (i.e., let us suppose that 𝑏𝑏 = 0 for 
all the individuals as in subsection 3.6). In this case, there would be no 
difference between type-E and type-N individuals. Indeed, all potential 
workers in the economy might be considered type-N individuals. Assuming, 
for instance, that the labor market is heading to a cyclical trough, then the 
likelihood of finding a job falls, and the non-labor income of the median 
worker decreases. Equations (18) and (20) explain how the PR would respond 
to this situation. As a consequence of the DWE, the PR should fall. And 
because of the AWE, the PR should experience an increase. What the 
researcher may observe directly through the data is the net effect. If we 
assume, for example, that the DWE is stronger than the AWE, a reduction in 
the PR would be estimated through econometric methods. This is the scenario 
depicted in Figure 1 (a) in section 2. 
 
If we relax the assumption of 𝑏𝑏 = 0 for all potential workers, the 
difference between type-E and type-N individuals emerges. And, as proved 
before, these two types of individuals behave differently. For this reason, let 
us define the proportion of type-E individuals within the total working-age 
population, 𝜃𝜃, as (24) indicates: 
 
(24)                                               𝜃𝜃 = 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 
 
with 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 being the number of type-E and type-N individuals, 
respectively. 
 
In expression (13), it is shown that the level of UB affects the median 
worker’s reservation wage and so the PR. On the other hand, exogenous 
changes in 𝜃𝜃 affect the level of UB for the median worker25. Given that we 
                                                          
25 A higher proportion of type-E workers raises the UB level for the median worker directly 
because the type-N workers are associated with a level 𝑏𝑏 = 0. There are mainly two channels 
through which the proportion defined in (23) may change systematically: first, legislative 
changes favoring the entitlement to the UB; and, second, structural changes in the working-
age population, creating a more work-committed pool of potential workers (since the 
entitlement is related to previous work experience). 
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will use an empirical version of 𝜃𝜃 to test our model in the next section, we 
switch from (13) to expression (25): 
 
(25)                                      𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝜙𝜙(𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 [𝑦𝑦(𝑋𝑋),𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋),𝜃𝜃]) 
 
which constitutes a key relationship for the empirical strategy.  
 
Traditionally, the literature on this topic has attempted to determine 
the sign of (26): 
 
(26)                                                            
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋 = 𝛽𝛽 ⋛ 0 
 
or, put differently, to determine whether the DWE prevails over the AWE or 
vice versa.  
 
The model developed here, in contrast, has defined a second-order 
theoretical effect, the EWE, which may be summarized mathematically 
through (27): 
 
(27)                                                          
𝜕𝜕2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 = 𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 < 0 
 
The negative sign in (27) is deduced from the discussion in subsections 
3.5, 3.6, and 3.7. If the starting point is, for example, the prevalence of the 
DWE over the AWE, the higher the proportion of type-E individuals within 
the working-age population is, the less pro-cyclical the PR is. This is so 
because while all type-N individuals will react pro-cyclically to changes in 𝑝𝑝, 
some of the type-E individuals will respond pro-cyclically and others counter-
cyclically. 
 
This situation is represented in the panel (b) of Figure 1. There, we 
considered two alternative settings for the Total Net Effect (TNE). The first 
one (TNE 1) only takes into account the aggregation of the AWE and the 
DWE. This would be the case of an economy without UB (i.e., b = 0 for all the 
individuals). In scenario 2, the Total Net Effect (TNE 2) incorporates the 
existence of UB. The underlying assumption behind this second theoretical 
setting is that the proportion of type-E individuals within the working-age 
population is monotonically increasing throughout the period considered. 
Formally:(𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡) 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡⁄ ) > 0, where 𝑡𝑡 stands for time. 
 
If we interpret 𝛽𝛽 in expressions (26) and (27) as the estimated 
sensitiveness of the PR to the business cycle (e.g., assuming linearity), what 
the panel (b) of Figure 1 shows is that: 
 
(28)                                              
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽�𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)�𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 = 𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 · 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 < 0 
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In words: as the proportion 𝜃𝜃 increases, the EWE becomes stronger and 
stronger. For this reason, the pro-cyclical profile of TNE 2 is less pronounced 
as time goes by. The second cycle peak (trough) is less sharp than the first 
one, and the third peak (trough) is almost negligible. More importantly, this 
decline in the pro-cyclical sensitivity of PR is a consequence of the EWE, not 
the AWE. This is the main theoretical outcome of this paper, which will be 
tested in section 4. 
 
 




To test the central hypothesis posed here, we need statistical information on 
the PR to be used as the dependant variable in the regressions. Furthermore, 
as a cyclical indicator, we use the unemployment rate (UR) of prime-age 
males (35-to-44 age group). In doing so, we minimize the potential problems 
of simultaneity and reverse causality. Data for PR and UR come from the 
OECD database26. The information about the number of UB beneficiaries 
comes from the Spanish Ministry of Labor administrative registers27. These 
are all very well-known series.  
 
Nevertheless, three comments regarding the PRs are worth noting. 
First, we utilize the 16-to-64 age group PR. First, despite the OCDE dubs this 
group 15-to-64, in Spain, the minimum working age is 16. Second, although 
it is possible to find figures before the year 1980 for the Spanish PRs within 
the OECD database, we limit our analysis to the period 1980-2019 since the 
number of UB beneficiaries started to be recorded in 1980. Finally, as shown 
below, there is a relevant discontinuity in the year 2001 due to a notable 
methodological change in the definition of unemployment, affecting labor 
force definition as well. For this reason, we include in the econometric 
regressions a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the year 2001 and 0 
otherwise trying to capture such a methodological change, and it proved to be 
very significant28.  
 
 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
 
As the theoretical effect that we attempt to identify is a second-order effect, 
our empirical strategy consists of two steps. In the first one, we estimate a set 
of cyclical sensitivities for the PRs in different periods. We implement this 
stage employing a rolling-window procedure. In the second step, we correlate 
the coefficients obtained in the first one with an empirical measure of the 
proportion of type-E individuals in the economy. 
                                                          
26 http://www.oecd.org/ 
27 http://www.empleo.gob.es/index.htm 
28 We also tried to identify other relevant methodological changes in the series, but no one 
proved to be very significant. 
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We have already established that the PR depends on the business cycle 
(𝑋𝑋) and other factors (𝑍𝑍). Thus, we can represent the PR as a general function 
of a cyclical variable 𝑋𝑋 and a vector 𝑍𝑍, as shown in (29): 
 
(29)                                                   𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍) 
 
We also assume that the business cycle affects the PR in the short run, 
whereas the rest of the factors comprised in the vector 𝑍𝑍 influence the PR in 
the long run. Furthermore, we model econometrically the general function 
(29) as the linear equation (30): 
 
(30)                                          ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 · ∆𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 
In expression (30), ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the first difference of the PR between year 𝑡𝑡 
and year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 reflects a constant linear trend underlying 
the data and would capture all those long-run factors comprised in the vector 𝑍𝑍. On the other hand, ∆𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the first difference of UR times minus 1. We 
change the sign of ∆𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 so as to obtain a cyclical indicator for the labor market 
that varies directly with the booms and downturns of the economy, which 
facilitates the interpretation of the results. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 stands for a random 
error term. We denote by 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 the sensitiveness of variations in PR to 
movements in UR since we calculate it by means of a Least Squares 
procedure. This approach follows closely that of the popular research work by 
Pencavel (1987). It is simple and easy to interpret29. At the same time, it is 
flexible enough to make use of the estimated 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 in the second step of our 
empirical strategy, as will be shown later. 
 
In order to check the robustness and the sensitivity of our analysis, we 
also carry out two additional empirical exercises. With these methods, we first 
detrend the series and then focus on the cyclical components of them. In doing 
so, we avoid the misleading results associated with spurious correlation as a 
consequence of the time trends of the series. 
 
Two alternative filters are employed. The first one is the Cubic Trend 
(CT) method. We estimate the time trend of the series with a polynomial of 
degree 3, and the residuals of that regression are assumed to be the cyclical 
component of the series30. In equation (31), 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 are cyclical 
components of the PR and the unemployment rate (times minus 1). 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the 
sensitiveness of changes in PR to movements in UR. 
 
(31)                                     𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 · 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 
                                                          
29 Moreover, as shown later on, the time-series in (30) turned out to be 𝐼𝐼(0) in first differences 
(i.e., they are stationary). Thus, we prevent the problems associated with spurious 
correlation. 
30 We also detrended the series with a polynomial of degree 2 (i.e., we use the Quadratic 
Trend method). However, the cyclical components thus obtained were not stationary. 
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The second filtering method is the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, using 𝜆𝜆 = 100, as suggested by most of the literature for annual data. As in the 
previous case, we regress the cyclical component (the gap between the original 
series and the HP trend) of participation rates (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) on the cyclical 
component of the prime-age male unemployment rate (𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) in equation 
(32)31: 
 
(32)                                      𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 · 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 
Figure 6 is the graphical representation of the time series used in this 
study. A necessary step to take is to ensure that the series used are 
stationary, otherwise the estimation of equations (30) through (32) would 
provide flawed results due to a spurious relationship among the involved 
variables. We compute standard unit root tests for each of the series employed 
in the empirical analysis. This is displayed in Table 1. Three different well-
known tests have been computed: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-
Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)32. Overall from 
Table 1 we find that our series are 𝐼𝐼(0) or stationary and hence the estimates 






Comparing and contrasting estimates from (30) through (32) allows us 
to obtain a point estimate of whether the PR is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. 
However, to test the theory developed in this paper, we have to elaborate more 
on the empirical strategy. As mentioned, the EWE is a second-order effect, 
i.e., it refers to how the sensitiveness of changes in PR to variations in UR 
evolves when the percentage of UB beneficiaries varies. Thus, we carry out 
the second step of our strategy so as to measure this second variation. 
 
In the second step, we make use of the rolling-window regression 
techniques. This procedure yields different values for the 𝛽𝛽 parameters: one 
value for each window. As we decided to use 15-year windows, we have 26 
values for 𝛽𝛽, starting in 1980-1994 and ending in 2005-201933. 
 
On the other hand, we need an empirical index of the proportion of 
type-E workers (PTEW) within the total working-age population. In the 
theoretical model, labor contracts are signed at the beginning of the period. 
                                                          
31 It is worth pointing out that the parameters 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in (31) and 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  in (32) are expected to be 
statistically non-significant as the series were previously detrended. 
32 See respectively Dickey and Fuller (1979), Phillips and Perron (1988), and Kwiatkowski et 
al. (1992). The null hypothesis of the former two is that the series have a unit root, whereas 
the null hypothesis for the latter is that the series are stationary. 
33 The size of each window is always debatable. For instance, in Knotek (2007), each rolling 
regression uses a sample period consisting of 13 years of data. Here, we are more conservative 
(to gain accuracy), and the size of the window consists of 15 annual observations, as in Porras 
and Martín-Román (2019). 
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In real life, however, some workers are employed in a specific moment, other 
workers are looking for a job (some of them are entitled and others not), and 
a fraction of the total population is out of the labor force. If we make the 
assumption that all workers currently employed are entitled to UB (as they 
have, in fact, work experience), and we add them to the pool of UB 
beneficiaries (which, indeed, are entitled at this time), we have a reasonably 
good approximation of the volume of type-E individuals34. If we then divide 
them by the total working-age population, we have PTEW as shown in 
equation (33): 
 
(33)                                           𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁  
 
where B stands for the number of UB beneficiaries, EM is the number of 
employed, and N refers to the total working-age population. We are aware 
that the PTEW index could not measure the exact figure for the proportion of 
type-E individuals in a specific year because it is only an approximation. 
Nonetheless, we deem that it depicts reasonably well the long-run changes in 
that percentage. Actually, what we use in the second step is the 15-year 
average of PTEW, and this measure is much less affected by yearly 
measurement errors, reflecting the relevant movements in the long-run trend 
of PTEW. 
 
The final stage of our empirical strategy consists in computing the 
correlation between PTEW and the group of “betas” estimated through the 
rolling-windows procedure. As mentioned above, we average 15-year periods 
of PTEW so as to match them to the corresponding estimated 𝛽𝛽 belonging to 
the same range of years (i.e., within the equivalent window period). We 
managed to gather data on the number of UB beneficiaries from 1980 
onwards (as far as we know, these are the longest time-series that can be 
obtained). 
 
In Figure 7, we show those 15-year average observations for PTEW. 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of that figure is its positive time-
trend. A second major feature is the wide variation range of the time-series. 
Starting with a value of 0.55 in the period 1980-1994, it ends with a value of 
0.69 in the period 2005-2019. These 14 percentage points imply an increase 
of about 25% throughout the whole period. This figure is a significant 
increase, so if the phenomenon we are analyzing in this paper is relevant, 




                                                          
34 Previous work experience is the essential requirement to gain entitlement to UB in Spain. 
Hence, assuming that current employees are entitled in a (potential) future unemployment 
spell seems to be a realistic supposition. 
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According to the theory previously presented, the higher is the 
percentage of type-E individuals within the total working-age population, the 
stronger is the EWE. Consequently, we expect a negative relationship 
between the size of the rolling-window estimated betas (𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ) and 
the 15-year average PTEW (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃15𝐴𝐴). The equation (34) formalizes 
Hypothesis 1 and is the empirical counterpart of equation (27): 
 
(34)                                               





Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equations (30) through (32). 
We break down the estimates into a twofold classification. First, the set of 
columns (1)-(3) refers to the three different econometric procedures above-
mentioned (LS, CT, and HP). Second, we also carry out the empirical analysis 
for three different periods. The first one covers the whole time horizon and 
ranges from 1980 to 2019. The other two are the sub-periods 1980-1999 and 
2000-2019, aiming at checking the stability of the estimates for the whole 




Overall, the results exhibit a high degree of consistency among the 
three econometric methods. For the whole period, both the LS and CT and HP 
estimates show no statistically significant effect of the business cycle on the 
PR. For the sub-period 1980-1999, the three procedures find a positive and 
significant relationship between the PR and the business cycle (i.e., the PRs 
are pro-cyclical in these years). Finally, for the sub-period 2000-2019, both LS 
and HP did not find a statistically significant relationship, while the CT 
procedure estimates a counter-cyclical behavior of the PR, significant at the 
5% level. 
 
At first glance, the absence of a significant relationship between the 
PR and the business cycle for the whole period could make the naïve observer 
think that the AWE and the DWE are of similar strength and offset each 
other. However, the reality behind the data is a lack of stability of the 
estimated parameter. The estimated betas for the two sub-periods confirm 
this view. Within the time span from 1980 to 1999, the cyclical sensitivity of 
the PR to business cycle movements is estimated significantly in the range of 
0.19 to 0.25. On the other hand, the LS and HP estimates for the period 2000-
2019 are not statistically significant, and the CT method produces a beta of -
0.05, implying a counter-cyclical behavior of the PR. 
 
Bearing in mind this empirical evidence, we check if the decline in the 
pro-cyclical behavior in the PR occurs suddenly or if, on the contrary, it is a 
gradual phenomenon. And, in the case of being a gradual phenomenon, we 
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also attempt to determine if the secular increase of the PTEW shown in 
Figure 7 is a major driving factor. With this aim, in a first stage, we calculate 
a continuum of estimated betas through a set of rolling-window regressions. 
This is what is displayed in Table 3. Then, in a second stage, we look for 
evidence of the second-order EWE by correlating the estimated betas with the 




In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we have 
represented the estimated betas from Table 3 in Figure 8. Two stylized facts 
can be observed in Table 3 and Figure 8. First, there is a clear negative 
trend in the estimated betas (as we move forward in time). Second, although 
there are slight differences in the order of magnitude of estimated betas 
regarding different econometric techniques, we find a high degree of 
correlation among them. To be more precise, the correlation coefficient 
between the series of 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is 𝑟𝑟 = 78.2%, between 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 is  𝑟𝑟 =




Furthermore, it should be emphasized the strong pro-cyclical pattern 
in the Spanish PR at the beginning of the period. For instance, the LS 
estimated parameter for the period 1980-1994 indicates that a 1-percentage 
point reduction in the unemployment rate would raise the PR by 0.28 
percentage points. The CT and the HP estimates yield a similar outcome, 0.26 
and 0.25, respectively. Moreover, the estimates are highly significant from a 
statistical point of view. As we progress in time, there is a steady decrease in 
the size of the calculated betas. It is also worth mentioning that, in the final 
years, some estimated parameters are no longer statistically significant (at 
the conventional levels), which is logical as the point estimates are in fact 
close to zero. Put in other words, the above-mentioned TNE is close to zero 
because of the composition effects of the AWE, the DWE, and the EWE. Even 
more importantly, in the very last years, the three methods produce negative 
values for the estimated betas, implying a counter-cyclical pattern in the PR.  
 
As illustrated by the previous analysis, the fall in the pro-cyclical 
behavior of Spanish PR is a progressive process. For this reason, we consider 
that the loss of procyclicality observed in the Spanish labor supply during the 
last years is a consequence of structural factors, not of short-term factors. As 
our theoretical framework establishes, we believe that the EWE is operating 
more intensively now that in the past and, consequently, weakening the DWE 
in recent years. The support for this statement can be found in Figure 7. As 
can be seen, the PTEW has reached its highest levels precisely in the last 
years. 
 
After having computed the 15-year rolling-window estimates for beta, 
in the second and final step of the empirical strategy, we proceed to correlate 
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them with their equivalent 15-year average of PTEW. Figure 9 shows this 
empirical exercise. We represent PTEW on the X-axis and beta on the Y-axis. 
In the upper panel, we display the betas obtained through LS, in the bottom-





Two essential conclusions can be drawn from the observation of Figure 
9. First, there exists a negative correlation between the rolling-window betas 
and PTEW, as predicted by the model. Second, that correlation seems to be 
pretty high. More specifically, the correlation coefficient in the LS case is 𝑟𝑟 =
85.6%, 𝑟𝑟 = 93.5% for the CT procedure, and 𝑟𝑟 = 98.8% for the HP estimates. 
These empirical results give credit to the theory developed in this article. In 
other words, Figure 9 is proof of the importance and significance of EWE. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper identifies and analyses a new effect as regards the cyclical 
behavior of labor supply that we dub the Entitled Worker Effect. To this end, 
we build a formal model in which we explicitly characterized the three 
theoretical channels recognized: the AWE, the DWE, and the EWE. The key 
point of this research is that the EWE has its own nature and is different from 
the two well-known effects concerning the labor supply and the business cycle 
(i.e., the AWE and the DWE). 
 
The central prediction of the model is that there should be a negative 
correlation between the cyclical sensitivity of the PR and the PTEW. Put 
differently, the higher the level of PTEW is, the stronger the EWE should be. 
The rationale for that outcome is, according to the model, that the EWE 
weakens the DWE and makes the PR less pro-cyclical. However, it is 
important to stress that the theoretical channel operating has nothing to do 
with a stronger income effect (i.e., a larger AWE) or with an unexplained 
change in the way the expectations affect labor supply choices (i.e., an 
unexplained decrease in the DWE). It has to do with the moral hazard created 
by an increasing proportion of people entitled to receive UB. 
 
The empirical evidence seems to support this interpretation of the 
facts. First, we observe a steady decline in the pro-cyclical sensitivity of the 
PR to the business cycle from 1980 to the present. Furthermore, the three 
econometric methods used (LS, CT, and HP) yield a similar evolution of the 
point estimates for that cyclical sensitivity, which is a sign of the robustness 
of the results. Second, this continuous decline in the estimated betas as time 
goes on coincides with a secular increase in the PTEW. When computing the 
correlation between the two variables, it is very high. Although it is a simple 
correlation and we do not perform a causality test, it is difficult to think of a 
reason for expecting a reverse causal-effect from cyclical sensitivity to the 
PTEW. Anyhow, this might be a field for future research. Also interestingly, 
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in the last “windows” of our rolling regression analysis, we detect a counter-
cyclical pattern of the PR. Determining if this empirical regularity is going to 
consolidate in the coming years appears to be an appealing avenue for future 
research.  
  
The policy implications are potentially profound. Traditionally, when 
the PR exhibited a counter-cyclical behavior during a downturn, it was 
assumed that the unemployment rate was overstated. The policy prescription 
for the Government was to reduce the fiscal stimulus, as the “actual” number 
of unemployed persons was less than that recorded in the official data. Thus, 
the aggregate demand management policy is the canonical recommendation. 
However, if the EWE is a major driving factor behind the weakening of the 
pro-cyclical movements of the PR, policymakers, on the contrary, must use 
supply-side measures to fight against the moral hazard problem addressed in 
this piece of research. To sum up, as the EWE appears to be an issue, 
economic authorities must monitor the UB system carefully to attempt to 
minimize the underlying opportunistic behavior. This political action, at the 
same time, would alleviate the financial difficulties that Social Security 
systems are facing nowadays in many countries. 
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Table 1. Unit roots tests 
 ADF PP KPSS 
 statistic p-value statistic p-value statistic 5% level 
ΔPR (16-64) -4.660 0.000 -4.784 0.000 0.196 0.463 
PRCT (16-64) -2.058 0.039 -2.218 0.027 0.085 0.463 
PRHP (16-64) -3.254 0.002 -3.279 0.002 0.099 0.463 
ΔUR -3.078 0.036 -3.176 0.029 0.085 0.463 
URCT -3.298 0.002 -2.065 0.039 0.069 0.463 
URHP -3.659 0.001 -2.429 0.016 0.052 0.463 
Notes: All the tests were carried out for the period 1980-2019. ΔPR stands for the first 
difference of the participation rate. PRCT is the cyclical gap after the Cubic Trend filtering 
procedure. PRHP is the cyclical gap attained after the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition. The 
same applies to the unemployment rate (UR). In the HP and CT tests, neither a constant nor 










Table 2. Cyclical sensitivity of PRs. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 LS  CT  HP  
 Coeff. (p-value)  Coeff. (p-value)  Coeff. (p-value)  
PR 16-64          
1980-2019          
Constant 0.415*** (0.00)  0.075 (0.54)  0.006 (0.93)  
Beta 0.025 (0.53)  -0.016 (0.52)  0.046 (0.14)  
D2001 -1.384*** (0.00)  -2.061*** (0.00)  -1.552*** (0.00)  
N 40  40  40  𝑃𝑃2 0.13  0.19  0.26  𝑃𝑃2���� 0.08  0.15  0.22  
1980-1999          
Constant 0.304*** (0.00)  0.155 (0.50)  -0.010 (0.89)  
Beta 0.251*** (0.01)  0.191* (0.06)  0.224*** (0.00)  
D2001 - -  - -  - -  
N 20  20  20  𝑃𝑃2 0.47  0.20  0.61  𝑃𝑃2���� 0.44  0.15  0.59  
2000-2019          
Constant 0.551*** (0.00)  0.183 (0.19)  0.127 (0.14)  
Beta -0.053 (0.37)  -0.047** (0.05)  -0.021 (0.44)  
D2001 1.400*** (0.00)  -2.024*** (0.00)  -1.530*** (0.00)  
N 20  20  20  𝑃𝑃2 0.26  0.50  0.52  𝑃𝑃2���� 0.18  0.44  0.46  
Notes: The set of columns (1) trough (3) refers to Least Squares, Cubic Trend and Hodrick-
Prescott estimates respectively. The coefficient captures the relationship between the 
variation of PR and (minus) the variation in prime-age males UR. t-statistics and p-values 
are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *** means 








Table 3. Beta estimates of the rolling-window regression. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
  LS   CT   HP  
 Coeff. p-val. R2 Coeff. p-val. R2 Coeff. p-val. R2 
PR 16-64          
1980-1994 0.281 0.033 0.46 0.256 0.000 0.61 0.245 0.001 0.64 
1981-1995 0.234 0.062 0.38 0.291 0.000 0.64 0.243 0.000 0.66 
1982-1996 0.221 0.064 0.36 0.310 0.000 0.63 0.237 0.000 0.68 
1983-1997 0.227 0.048 0.38 0.321 0.000 0.59 0.234 0.000 0.69 
1984-1998 0.211 0.036 0.36 0.281 0.001 0.41 0.235 0.000 0.68 
1985-1999 0.200 0.042 0.33 0.218 0.051 0.24 0.226 0.000 0.63 
1986-2000 0.200 0.027 0.29 0.175 0.091 0.16 0.211 0.000 0.61 
1987-2001 0.204 0.029 0.58 0.180 0.113 0.36 0.187 0.000 0.81 
1988-2002 0.075 0.474 0.37 0.113 0.255 0.29 0.171 0.001 0.72 
1989-2003 0.055 0.614 0.34 0.095 0.208 0.32 0.151 0.002 0.77 
1990-2004 0.080 0.473 0.39 0.079 0.169 0.36 0.133 0.008 0.76 
1991-2005 0.100 0.376 0.41 0.076 0.101 0.44 0.106 0.007 0.78 
1992-2006 0.093 0.447 0.44 0.097 0.058 0.53 0.102 0.002 0.81 
1993-2007 0.014 0.921 0.49 0.125 0.017 0.59 0.101 0.000 0.82 
1994-2008 -0.081 0.387 0.57 0.155 0.005 0.57 0.119 0.000 0.81 
1995-2009 0.023 0.665 0.54 0.089 0.351 0.35 0.098 0.031 0.69 
1996-2010 0.047 0.241 0.60 0.013 0.871 0.29 0.063 0.139 0.63 
1997-2011 0.055 0.127 0.58 -0.032 0.529 0.33 0.037 0.317 0.61 
1998-2012 0.070 0.041 0.58 -0.051 0.110 0.42 0.008 0.762 0.62 
1999-2013 0.088 0.006 0.54 -0.043 0.116 0.51 0.004 0.849 0.69 
2000-2014 0.052 0.346 0.42 -0.028 0.274 0.58 0.011 0.545 0.74 
2001-2015 0.001 0.985 0.38 -0.020 0.441 0.60 0.011 0.565 0.73 
2002-2016 -0.023 0.676 0.01 -0.021 0.402 0.04 0.009 0.629 0.01 
2003-2017 -0.042 0.390 0.05 -0.017 0.463 0.03 0.004 0.841 0.00 
2004-2018 -0.054 0.207 0.11 -0.025 0.331 0.06 -0.009 0.728 0.01 
2005-2019 -0.057 0.176 0.12 -0.034 0.201 0.10 -0.018 0.509 0.03 
Notes: The set of columns (1) trough (3) refers to Least Squares, Cubic Trend, and Hodrick-
Prescott estimates respectively. As mentioned in the text, the coefficient captures the 
relationship between the variation of PR and (minus) the variation in prime-age males UR. 
T-statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Figure 1. Business cycle, AWE, DWE and Total Net Effect 
 














































Figure 2. Set of alternatives for the worker. 
 









Not to find a job 
(probability 1-p)
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To find a job
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Figure 3. Reservation wage and UB 
 


















Figure 4. Reservation wage and non-labor income variations. 
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Figure 5. Reservation wage and the likelihood of finding a job. 
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Figure 6. Cyclical components of the PR and UR. 
 



































































































































































































Figure 7. Evolution of 15-year average of PTEW. 
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Figure 8. Beta LS, Beta CT, and Beta HP. 
 
Source: Own Elaboration.  
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Figure 9. Correlation between Beta and PTEW. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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